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Can there be epistemic dilemmas? I say yes (Hughes 2019, fc1, ms1, ms2). 
Daniel Greco (this volume) says no.1 He suggests that the mark of a 
dilemma is unavoidable residue. If you face a dilemma, then no matter what 
you do you will rightly be the target of blame or resentment, owe an 
apology or reparations, feel guilt or remorse, or something along these 
lines. But whilst we can make sense of the idea of unavoidable moral 
residue – and hence moral dilemmas – there are, Greco argues, principled 
reasons to think there can never be unavoidable epistemic residue. If so, 
there cannot be epistemic dilemmas.  
 
 
* Forthcoming in the Oxford University Press volume Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. The final 
version might be a bit different. Nevertheless, feel free to cite this version. Got questions or 
comments? Email me! 
1 Actually, strictly speaking he’s neutral-but-sceptical. I’ll present him as a straight up ‘no’ 
for ease of exposition. Nothing important will turn on the difference.  
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Greco’s argument is unsuccessful. In the first part of this chapter I’ll 
explain why. Nevertheless, his essay poses an important challenge to 
those of us who maintain that there are epistemic dilemmas. Greco thinks 
that if we don’t identify epistemic dilemmas with unavoidable epistemic 
residue, disputes between those who argue that there are epistemic 
dilemmas and those who argue that there aren’t may turn out to be merely 
verbal. This is wrong; they don’t. In the second part of the chapter I’ll 
explain why.  
 
I’ll start, in §2, by saying a bit about what epistemic dilemmas are and why 
there can be such things. In §3 I’ll present Greco’s anti-dilemmas 
argument. In §4 I’ll identify three problems with the argument, which 
should lead us to reject it. In §5 I’ll argue that there could be epistemic 
dilemmas even if the mark of an epistemic dilemma was unavoidable 
epistemic residue. In §6 and §7 I’ll discuss the matter of verbal disputes. 
I’ll show how diagnostic tools other than residue can be used to adjudicate 






I call the view that there are epistemic dilemmas ‘dilemmism’. An 
epistemic dilemma is a conflict in epistemic ‘oughts’. A paradigmatic 
example is a situation in which you ought (epistemically) to adopt 
doxastic attitude D, and at the same time ought (epistemically) not adopt 
doxastic attitude D. I call these ‘conflict cases’. In conflict cases, whatever 
you do, you’ll do something wrong from the epistemic point of view.  
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Here’s an example, which will be my focus in this chapter.2 Consider these 
two norms: 
 
KNOWLEDGE: One ought, epistemically, to believe that p only if one 
knows that p 
 
RATIONALITY: One ought, epistemically, to be epistemically 
rational 
 
In some circumstances they issue conflicting instructions. To see this, 
consider the following case (c.f. Hughes fc1, ms1): 
 
BRUEGHEL: The Crucifixion, a painting by Pieter Brueghel the 
Younger, hangs in a church in a small town in Northern Italy. A 
gang of thieves intends to steal it. After weeks of planning, late 
one March night they quietly disable the church alarm system, 
break in through the apse door, snatch the painting from its frame, 
and make their escape. Back at the boss’s house, they celebrate; 
they expect to negotiate a large ransom from the government for 
its return. Meanwhile, the local police are also celebrating. After 
being tipped off about the thieves’ plan, they set up a hidden 
camera in the church and replaced the painting with an identical-
looking replica. Now they can use the camera footage to identify 
the thieves. The actual Brueghel is sitting in a vault in the 
basement of the Uffizi.3 
 
 
2 This isn’t the only kind of epistemic dilemma. For discussion of others, see Hughes (2019, 
fc1, ms2). 
3 This is based on a true story. Check it out: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
47568323  
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Let ‘p’ = ‘the thieves have a painting by Brueghel’. According to 
KNOWLEDGE the thieves shouldn’t believe that p, because it’s false. But it 
would be irrational for them not to believe it. So according to RATIONALITY 
they should believe that p. Hence, if KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY are 
both genuine epistemic norms, the thieves should believe that p, and, at 
the same time, shouldn’t believe that p. That is, they face an epistemic 
dilemma. According to dilemmism, that’s just how it is; we shouldn’t try 
to avoid the dilemmic conclusion by denying one of the norms, or by 
claiming that one is weightier than the other, or anything like that. 
 
Why accept the dilemmic view? Mark Nelson (2020) suggests that 
dilemmists might be driven by a perverse delight in making philosophical 
mischief, or perhaps by a kind of Romantic misologism. Now, I enjoy 
mischief and misologism as much as the next person, but my reasons are 
altogether less exciting. There are three of them. First, dilemmism allows 
us to embrace simple and straightforward interpretations of KNOWLEDGE 
and RATIONALITY. Prima facie, conformity with them is non-optional from 
the point of view of epistemic normativity. Dilemmism accommodates 
this observation. That is a good reason to accept it. The price to be paid is 
accepting epistemic dilemmas. It is a price worth paying. Second, as I have 
argued elsewhere (Hughes 2019, fc1, ms1), objections to the dilemmic 
view aren’t nearly as persuasive as they might first seem. Third, (as we’ll 
see), there is no plausible non-dilemmic account of these norms. So we’re 
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§III. Greco’s Anti-Dilemmas Argument 
 
 
§3.1. Epistemic Blame 
 
Greco thinks dilemmism is untenable. His anti-dilemmas argument starts 
with the idea that the mark of a moral dilemma is unavoidable moral 
residue. According to this view, a situation is a moral dilemma just in case, 
whatever you do in that situation, you will rightly be a target of blame or 
resentment, owe an apology or reparations, feel guilt or remorse, or 
something along these lines. Consider the famous case of Sartre’s student. 
He was torn between staying home with his mother, for whom he was the 
only source of comfort and solace in life, and leaving home to fight fascism 
with the Free French. It’s not implausible to suppose there would have 
been some kind of moral residue whatever he did. If he stayed home to 
look after his mother, he would have, not unreasonably, felt guilty for not 
joining the struggle. But if he left home to join the struggle, he would have 
felt guilty for abandoning his mother – once again, his guilt would not 
have been unreasonable.  
 
If the mark of a moral dilemma is unavoidable moral residue, it’s natural 
to think that the mark of an epistemic dilemma – if there can be such a 
thing – is unavoidable epistemic residue. But what could this residue be? 
One possibility is that it is just the same thing as moral residue. If so, an 
epistemic dilemma is a situation in which guilt, remorse, blame, 
resentment, apologies, reparation, or some such is unavoidable whatever 
you believe. As Greco points out, if that’s right, then it is implausible to 
think there are epistemic dilemmas – at least of the kind I think there are. 
That’s not to say that this kind of residue never attaches to beliefs. If I 
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believe that you committed some heinous crime, purely on the basis of a 
prejudice against you, and without any evidence, then it would be 
appropriate for you to feel resentful. I should also feel guilty, and I owe 
you an apology too. But it is surely a mistake to think that these sorts of 
reactions are always appropriate in response to people believing what they 
don’t know or believing irrationally. They wouldn’t be appropriate 
reactions to have towards the thieves in the BRUEGHEL case when they 
falsely believe that they have a Brueghel, for instance. 
 
For this reason, Greco argues that dilemmists are better off looking for a 
distinctive kind of epistemic residue. He proposes that it consists in 
epistemic blame, which he understands as the withdrawal of trust in a 
person as a reliable source of information: 
 
EPISTEMIC BLAME AS TRUST WITHDRAWAL: To epistemically blame 
someone is to withdraw trust in them as a reliable source of 
information.4 
 
Greco argues that if epistemic residue is understood along the lines of 
EPISTEMIC BLAME AS TRUST WITHDRAWAL, it cannot be unavoidable. If the 
mark of an epistemic dilemma is unavoidable epistemic residue, it follows 
that there cannot be epistemic dilemmas.  
 
§3.1. The Reflection Argument 
 
I’ll call Greco’s argument the ‘Reflection Argument’, because it starts from 
the assumption that the following is a requirement of rationality: 
 
4 As Greco emphasises, withdrawal may only be partial (you still give their word some weight) 
and local (it may only concern certain topics). 
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REFLECTION: Your present beliefs should be a weighted guess as to 
what your future beliefs will be. 
 
REFLECTION is motivated by the idea that if you know it’s likely that you’ll 
get compelling evidence for p tomorrow, this should be reflected in your 
beliefs today – you should already be confident that p is true.5  
 
The Reflection Argument is simple. However, a word of caution: in order 
to best understand the argument, it will be helpful to put the KNOWLEDGE 
vs. RATIONALITY conflicts described above out of mind for the time being 
(I’ll have much more to say about them shortly) and just consider in the 
abstract the idea that there could be unavoidable epistemic residue in the 
form of EPISTEMIC BLAME AS TRUST WITHDRAWAL. That is, consider the 
general idea that there can be situations in which, whatever someone 
believes, it will be appropriate for you to withdraw trust in them as a 
reliable source of information. Done that? Good. Now for the argument.  
 
It goes like this. Suppose that at time t1 you treat Dylan as a reliable 
epistemic surrogate, meaning that you’re prepared to defer to her 
judgement on a wide range of questions. At t1 you believe that p on 
Dylan’s say-so. Let’s say that p = ‘vitamin C prevents the common cold’. 
However, you know that at t2 she will face what you will regard as an 
epistemic dilemma. As a result, whatever attitude she forms at t2 you will 
judge her to be epistemically blameworthy. Given EPISTEMIC BLAME AS 
TRUST WITHDRAWAL, this means that you know at t1 that at t2 you will no 
 
5 As Greco notes, the principle may need to be refined to handle tricky cases. For instance, 
we don’t want to say that if you know that you’ll believe that p tomorrow because you will 
have been brainwashed, you should believe that p today. We can ignore such complications 
here. 
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longer be prepared to defer to Dylan’s judgement about p. But of course 
you don’t blame her at t1, as she hasn’t encountered the dilemma yet, and 
so hasn’t yet done anything to merit blame. So, you are still prepared to 
defer to her at t1 by believing that p on her say-so. But this means that you 
violate REFLECTION – you believe that p (= vitamin C prevents the common 
cold) on Dylan’s say-so at t1 whilst at the same time knowing that at t2 
you’ll regard yourself as having insufficient evidence to believe this, 
Dylan having revealed herself to be untrustworthy. So, the existence of 
epistemic dilemmas is incompatible with REFLECTION. Since REFLECTION is 
true, it follows that there cannot be epistemic dilemmas. 
 
 
§IV. Why the Reflection Argument Doesn’t Work 
 
 
Should we conclude on the basis of the Reflection Argument that there 
cannot be epistemic dilemmas, then? No. There are three serious problems 
with the argument.  
 
§4.1. Blame and Quasi-Blame 
 
The first problem is this. The argument depends on the assumption that 
you cannot rationally, or perhaps even literally, “blame” Dylan at t1 for 
what she will do at t2 by withdrawing trust in her at t1.6 For suppose that 
you could. In that case, you would not be doomed to violate REFLECTION. 
Upon coming to know that she will face what you regard as a dilemma at 
t2, you could, rationally, revise your belief that p at t1. And if you did, you 
 
6 The scare quotes around “blame” are deliberate, for reasons that will soon become clear. 
DRAFT 31/03/2021 12:23 
Page 9 of 38 
 
wouldn’t violate REFLECTION. That is, you wouldn’t be in a state of 
believing that p even whilst knowing that soon you will regard yourself 
as having insufficient evidence to believe that p. 
 
But is it true that you cannot, or at least should not, “blame” Dylan at t1 
for what she will do at t2 by withdrawing trust in her at t1? I don’t think 
so. What might well be true is that you cannot blame someone for φ-ing 
before they have φ-ed in the ordinary sense of ‘blame’. If I know that you’ll 
betray me next year, then whilst I might feel angry and resentful about the 
fact that you will betray me, it is tempting to say that I cannot blame you 
for betraying me until you’ve actually done the deed. Or, even if I can, I 
shouldn’t – preemptive punishment is wrong. But the kind of “blame” that 
Greco’s argument makes use of quite clearly isn’t blame in the ordinary 
sense. One can withdraw epistemic trust in a person without any of the 
characteristic properties of blame (anger, resentment, etc.) being present. 
Here’s an example. Suppose your kindly grandfather develops dementia. 
You begin to notice a decline in his cognitive performance – he starts 
saying strange things for which he has no evidence. You downgrade 
epistemic trust in him as a result. But do you blame him? Certainly not, at 
least in the ordinary sense of blame. You harbour no anger or resentment 
towards him – only pity. 
 
This suggests that epistemic blame, as Greco defines it in EPISTEMIC BLAME 
AS TRUST WITHDRAWAL, isn’t really a kind of blame at all. Or, if it is, it is 
atypical. So, in order to avoid confusion, it will be useful to give it a 
different name. Let’s call it ‘quasi-blame’.  
 
It might not be possible or rational to preemptively blame someone at t1 
for what they haven’t yet done but will do at t2. But is it possible to 
preemptively quasi-blame someone at t1 for what you know they will do 
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at t2 by withdrawing trust from them at t1? And if it is possible, can it also 
be rational? The answer to both of these questions is surely ‘yes’. To see 
why, let’s put dilemmas aside for a moment. Imagine that an episode of 
InfoWars has just been broadcast, propagating spurious evidence-free 
conspiratorial nonsense as usual.7 Dylan hasn’t seen it yet. But you know 
that she will, and that when she does, she’ll be taken in by it. Given this, it 
would be rational for you to withdraw epistemic trust in her now. There’s 
no need to wait, because you already know everything you need to know 
about her epistemic incompetence. This shows that preemptive quasi-
blame is both possible and sometimes rational.  
 
Now, back to dilemmas. You know at t1 that Dylan will face what you 
regard as an epistemic dilemma at t2, and so no matter what she does you 
will withdraw epistemic trust in her. What is the rational thing for you to 
do now, at t1? Well, given that preemptive quasi-blame can be rational, it 
might well be to withdraw trust in her now. Nothing Greco has argued 
shows us otherwise.8  But if you do withdraw trust in her now, you won’t 
 
7 For readers fortunate enough not to be familiar with InfoWars, it is a far-right US website 
and “news” show which promotes New World Order, 9/11, chemtrail, QAnon, and false flag, 
conspiracy theories.  
8 Curiously, Greco seems to agree, but misses the significance of the point. He writes 
“…”punishment” for epistemic wrongdoing plausibly differs from punishment for moral 
wrongdoing. While it’s a matter of some controversy, it’s commonly held that it is immoral 
to blame or punish people for crimes that they haven’t in fact committed, even when they 
almost certainly will commit some crime, or we know that they would commit such a crime 
in the right circumstances. More generally, the idea seems to be that bad (moral) character 
isn’t enough—bad moral character must be manifested in some bad act for certain negative 
reactive attitudes to be warranted. But if epistemic “punishment” is just the withdrawal of 
deference, such a restriction isn’t plausible. Bad “epistemic character” is enough to warrant 
epistemic “punishment”, even in the absence of some manifestation of that bad character in 
a cognitive act of (irrational) belief. If I know you’re the sort of person who would believe in 
homeopathy, were you to consider the question, then I know you have poor judgment, and 
this provides me the same sort of reason to cease relying on your concerning medical matters 
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violate REFLECTION, as you won’t be in a state believing that p even whilst 
knowing that soon you’ll regard yourself as having insufficient evidence 
to believe that p. This shows that there is no tension between REFLECTION, 
on the one hand, and the idea that epistemic dilemmas should be thought 
of along the lines of unavoidable trust withdrawal, on the other. But if not, 




The argument has another serious problem.  
 
Epistemic dilemmas are situations in which one is subject to conflicting 
epistemic ‘oughts’, such that if one satisfies the first, one will violate the 
other, and vice versa, with the result that no matter what one does, one is 
guaranteed to do something wrong from the epistemic point of view. In 
order for the Reflection Argument to be effective against this view, we 
have to assume that a subject, S, has violated an epistemic ought in φ-ing 
only if it is appropriate to quasi-blame S for φ-ing. If we don’t assume this, 
then the argument could not show that there cannot be epistemic 
dilemmas.  
 
Now, consider the Dylan case again, but this time replace ‘faces an 
epistemic dilemma’ with ‘violates epistemic norm N’, where N is some 
candidate epistemic norm purporting to give rise to epistemic 
requirements, like, say, ‘believe what your evidence supports’. So, at t1 you 
know that at t2 Dylan will violate N, and you’ll quasi-blame her as a result 
 
as I’d have if I knew that you had already considered the question and adopted a belief in 
homeopathy”. 
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by withdrawing trust. On the assumption that it’s not rational (and 
perhaps not even possible) to quasi-blame someone for φ-ing before they 
have φ-ed – an assumption we have already seen is essential to the 
Reflection Argument – we can now derive a violation of REFLECTION: you 
believe that p on Dylan’s say-so at t1 even whilst knowing that you won’t 
believe that p at t2 because Dylan will have shown herself to be 
untrustworthy. Following Greco’s reasoning, we can now conclude that N 
isn’t a genuine epistemic norm. But N could have been pretty much any 
putative epistemic norm. It could have been ‘believe what your evidence 
supports’. It could even have been ‘don’t believe in a way that makes you 
epistemically untrustworthy’. So, if we accept the Reflection Argument, 
we will have to conclude that there aren’t any epistemic norms at all. 
Hence, the argument overgenerates disastrously. 
 
§4.3. Inscrutable Cognizers 
 
The third problem with the argument is what I’ll call ‘the problem of 
inscrutable cognizers’. Focus again on the assumption that S has violated 
an epistemic ought in φ-ing only if it is appropriate to epistemically quasi-
blame S for φ-ing by withdrawing trust. Assuming that these oughts are 
generated by epistemic norms, it follows that only creatures we are 
capable of trusting as reliable sources of information can be subject to 
epistemic norms. For if a creature cannot be trusted as a reliable source of 
information in the first place, trust cannot be withdrawn – you can’t take 
back what was never given. But we stand, and are only able to stand, in 
this kind of trusting relationship with a rather limited range of creatures. 
Our fellow humans, most obviously, and perhaps a few non-human 
animals such as guide dogs. But what about, say, octopuses and lobsters? 
Both are highly intelligent species. But it stretches credulity to suppose 
that we could rely on creatures so utterly alien to ourselves as reliable 
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sources of information. Ipso facto, it is implausible to suppose that we could 
ever withdraw epistemic trust from them. It follows, given the assumption 
under consideration, that epistemic norms do not apply to them. 
 
Should we accept this result? Many epistemologists will be happy to. It is 
often said that epistemic norms only apply to humans.9 That’s wrong. 
There’s no denying that some epistemic norms are distinctly human. 
‘Don’t trust InfoWars’ – there wouldn’t be much point in trying to 
understand octopus cognition by apply that norm. But the most basic and 
fundamental epistemic norms apply to virtually all cognizers, human or 
otherwise. KNOWLEDGE is a case in point. All animals, including octopuses 
and lobsters, need to know what’s happening in their environment in 
order to navigate it successfully.10 RATIONALITY is another example. 
Plausibly, epistemic rationality is a matter of exercising cognitive 
dispositions that are conducive to knowing.11 The possession and exercise 
of such dispositions is just as important for an octopus or a lobster as it is 
for us.12  
 
If epistemic norms apply to non-human animals, why do so many 
epistemologists think otherwise? Here’s what I think is going on. Many of 
our everyday epistemic evaluations are infused with Strawsonian reactive 
 
9 See, for instance, Alston (1988) and Brandom (1994). The idea that epistemic norms only 
apply to humans seems to be implicit in the work of many contemporary epistemologists 
insofar as they propose norms that could not possibly apply to most non-human animals.  
10 C.f. Kornblith (2002). 
11 The pioneer of this way of thinking about epistemic rationality is Maria Lasonen-Aarnio 
(2010, 2020a, 2020b, fc1, fc2). See also Williamson (fc1, fc2) and Hughes (fc2, ms1). 
12 Of course, we may not feel comfortable using the words ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’ when 
talking about octopuses and lobsters. This is revealing, and I will have more to say about it 
momentarily. In the meantime, we can simply note that nothing forces us to use these words 
– they could be replaced by technical terms that don’t have the same connotations. The 
substantive point would still stand. 
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attitudes – attitudes that it only makes sense to adopt towards people. The 
language of normative epistemology reflects this. One often hears talk 
(including in this chapter) of people being epistemically ‘responsible’ or 
‘irresponsible’, ‘justified’ or ‘unjustified’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘unreasonable’, 
‘rational’ or ‘irrational’. There is discussion of epistemic ‘accountability’ 
and epistemically ‘praiseworthy’ and ‘blameworthy’ behaviour. We talk 
of epistemic ‘virtues’, ‘duties’, ‘obligations’, ‘permissions’, ‘prohibitions’, 
and ‘requirements’, and of ‘excuses’ and ‘exemptions’. What is striking 
about these concepts is that very few of them, if any, can be comfortably 
applied to most non-human animals. It just sounds weird to say of an 
octopus or a lobster (or even a dog) that it is being unreasonable, or that it 
has a duty to be rational. To the extent that such language can be used, it 
has a metaphorical feel to it, or it is as if we are generously but temporarily 
(and not entirely seriously) extending the boundaries of personhood. Why 
does this way of talking sound strange? The obvious explanation is that 
we cannot enter into the kinds of sophisticated interpersonal relationships 
with these animals that the correct application of these concepts 
presupposes.  
 
Now, it’s hardly surprising that many of our epistemic evaluations take 
this form. Given that we depend on each other as sources of knowledge, it 
is to be expected that a social practice of praise and criticism will have 
developed with which we can keep one another in line, epistemically 
speaking. And a practice that draws on the full range of reactive attitudes 
is much more likely to be effective than one that does not. You’ll do a better 
job of changing someone’s mind by treating them as a person rather than 
an object. Nor is the practice uninteresting for normative epistemology. 
However, it does bring with it a risk. We are liable to forget (or simply fail 
to notice in the first place) what the ultimate purpose of this practice is: to 
bring about conformity with basic norms of cognition, like KNOWLEDGE 
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and RATIONALITY. When this is overlooked, it is easy to confuse the social 
practice itself with the norms that it enforces, in effect treating the social 
practice as the bedrock of epistemic normativity. And since most non-
human animals cannot enter into the social practice, it is natural to 
conclude that they cannot be subject to epistemic norms. But just because 
they cannot enter into the social practice, that doesn’t mean that the basic 
norms the social practice emerged to enforce don’t apply to them. Once 
we recognise this, it becomes clear that the assumption that S has violated 
an epistemic norm in φ-ing only if it is appropriate to epistemically quasi-
blame S for φ-ing by withdrawing trust simply cannot be right. And if not, 
the Reflection Argument should be rejected, as it relies on an flawed 
diagnostic tool for identifying epistemic norms.  
 
I want to be clear on how minimal a claim I need here.  One might object 
that we don’t know enough about octopuses and lobsters to be confident 
that KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY apply to them. Perhaps the 
fundamental epistemic norms that govern their cognition are different to 
those that govern ours? This is highly doubtful – we should not 
underestimate how fundamental and widespread the need for knowledge 
is.13 However, even if we were to accept the objection, it wouldn’t affect 
my point. We only need one case of an inscrutable cognizer to whom 
KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY apply to make the point, and that case only 
needs to be possible – it need not be actual. So, if actual non-human animals 
don’t persuade you, consider instead a fictional cognizer – I’ll call it ‘The 
Inscrutable Cognizer’ – which, by stipulation, thinks in such a way that 
 
13 As Kornblith (2002) emphasises, it is impossible to understand the behaviour of nonhuman 
animals without attributing knowledge to them. None of this is to deny that many of the 
epistemic norms that apply to octopus and lobster cognition will be radically different to 
norms that apply to human cognition. But KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY will still be there, 
grounding the rest. 
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KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY apply to it, but which is inscrutable in a way 
that makes it impossible for us to place trust in it as a source of 
information, and hence impossible for us to withdraw trust in it. The 
Inscrutable Cognizer is surely possible.14 This fact alone shows that we 
should not try to identify epistemic norms by the method Greco proposes. 
 
The Inscrutable Cognizer is a powerful philosophical device. Another 
objection might appeal to the idea that even if we can’t trust, and hence 
withdraw trust, in octopuses, lobsters, and the like, their conspecifics can. 
If so, then it might be argued that a thinker has violated epistemic norms 
only when it is appropriate for conspecifics to withdraw trust in them as 
reliable sources of information. However, we can imagine that The 
Inscrutable Cognizer is an extremely asocial creature which cannot stand 
in trust relations even with its own kind, nor with any other species. 
KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY apply to it all the same. 
 
 
§V. Beyond the Reflection Argument 
 
 
The Reflection Argument doesn’t work, then. And the problem of 
inscrutable cognizers shows that we shouldn’t try to identify epistemic 
 
14 The 2016 film Arrival provides a vivid example. In the film mysterious extraterrestrial 
spacecraft arrive on Earth, containing Cephalopod-like creatures called ‘heptapods’. 
Heptapods are obviously highly intelligent – they have mastered interstellar travel, after all 
– but virtually impossible to communicate with, owing to their morphology and radically 
alien form of language. Much of the plot of the film is taken up with scientist’s struggles 
interpret them. A Hollywood ending requires, of course, that the communication barrier is 
eventually overcome, so the example isn’t perfect, but it is easy to imagine a version of the 
film in which it is insurmountable. The film is based on the SF writer Ted Chiang’s short 
story ‘Story of Your Life’. The film is quite good. Chiang’s story is sentimental rubbish.  
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norms by looking for residue, at least not if residue is understood in terms 
of EPISTEMIC BLAME AS TRUST WITHDRAWAL.15 Nevertheless, one might still 
be curious if there could be epistemic dilemmas if we take the mark of a 
dilemma to be unavoidable residue and residue is understood in terms of 
trust withdrawal. The answer is ‘yes’. Here’s an example. 
 
§5.1. Cognitive Penetration 
 
Jamie thinks he’s God’s gift to women. One of the many unfortunate 
consequences of this is that his perceptual experiences are cognitively 
penetrated by his inflated sense of his own attractiveness. In particular, 
when he sees women on the street, he often sees their facial expressions 
and gestures as flirtatious when in fact they are neutral. Once we learn this 
about Jamie, we will have reason to withdraw epistemic trust in him, at 
least when it comes to questions about who fancies him. But imagine that 
instead he were to simply ignore these perceptual experiences, even 
though he is completely unaware that his faculties have gone awry and 
that the experiences misrepresent reality. Jamie would be disregarding 
perceptual experiences without being able to cite any reason to do so. This 
would be baffling behaviour, behaviour that doesn’t speak well of his 
 
15 It might be thought that we should instead try to understand epistemic norms and 
epistemic dilemmas in terms of some other kind of epistemic residue. But consider the kinds 
of residue that Greco mentions: blame, resentment, apologies, reparations, guilt, and 
remorse. All involve reactive attitudes that it is only appropriate to adopt towards persons. 
This suggests that residue, at least as Greco thinks of it, can only attach to the actions of 
persons. If so, trying to identify epistemic norms by looking for residue will be a futile 
endeavour, since, as we have seen, epistemic norms do not only apply to persons. The 
alternative is to shift to a more encompassing conception of residue. But if we do so, then for 
all we have seen unavoidable epistemic residue (and hence epistemic dilemmas) may well 
be possible. In any case, I will shortly argue that we have good reasons to posit epistemic 
norms even when violations of them leave no residue at all. 
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cognitive dispositions. For if he is disposed to ignore these perceptual 
experiences, then he will also be disposed to ignore perceptual experiences 
that are not the result of cognitive penetration. This means he will not be 
a reliable source of information about what’s going on around him. As a 
result, we will have reason to withdraw trust in him once again. So, 
whatever Jamie does, we will have reason to withdraw epistemic trust 
from him. According to Greco’s criteria, this makes the case an epistemic 
dilemma.16 
 
§5.2. KNOWLEDGE/RATIONALITY Conflicts 
 
What about conflicts between KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY? Is trust 
withdrawal appropriate whatever the agent does in these cases? Greco 
thinks not. I agree. Consider the BRUEGHEL case. If one of the thieves were 
not to believe that they have a painting by Brueghel, thereby thinking 
irrationally, we would have reason to withdraw epistemic trust from him, 
just as we would with Jamie were he not to believe his eyes. However, if 
he believes that they have a Brueghel, then intuitively this should not lead 
us to withdraw trust, even though his belief is false. Why is this? The most 
likely explanation, it seems to me, is that our willingness to continue 
trusting or to withdraw trust when a mistake has been made is sensitive 
to facts about what explains the mistake. The thief’s mistake is best 
explained by the fact that he is in abnormal circumstances for belief 
formation. Had things been normal, he would have known that they have 
a Brueghel. The normality or abnormality of the circumstances in which a 
mistake was made is something we take into account when deciding 
whether to withdraw trust or not. And with good reason, it would be 
 
16 For more discussion of these kinds of cases in relation to epistemic dilemmas, see Hughes 
(ms2). 
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unrealistic and impractical to demand infallibility from our sources; so 
long as they are reliable in normal circumstances, that’s good enough. 
 
This suggests that epistemic residue, understood as trust withdrawal, 
attaches to violations of RATIONALITY but not to violations of KNOWLEDGE 
that aren’t also violations of RATIONALITY. An obvious conclusion to draw 
from this – one that Greco seems to be keen to draw – is that KNOWLEDGE 
isn’t a genuine epistemic norm. Only RATIONALITY is. If so, there are no 
KNOWLEDGE/RATIONALITY dilemmas.  
 
Let’s call this view RATIONALITY ONLY Is it tenable? Greco suggests that 
dilemmists who reject it, arguing that KNOWLEDGE is a genuine 
requirement-generating norm too, may only have a verbal disagreement 
with those who hold this view. Both parties seem to agree on all practical 
matters, such as when epistemic blame in the form of trust withdrawal is 
appropriate. If so, what more is there to discuss? 
 
Quite a lot, as it turns out. There are other ways of identifying epistemic 
norms than just by looking at the residue violations of them leave. In the 
next section I’ll argue that they show the RATIONALITY ONLY view to be 
untenable. In §7 I’ll argue that no other non-dilemmic take on conflict 
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§VI. RATIONALITY Without KNOWLEDGE? 
 
 
§6.1. The Explanatory Problem 
 
As it stands, the RATIONALITY ONLY view faces a serious explanatory 
problem.  
 
If epistemic rationality is a matter of exercising cognitive dispositions that 
are conducive to knowledge, then the thief’s belief is rational because it is 
the manifestation of a knowledge-conducive disposition; in normal 
circumstances he would have known that they have a Breughel. Likewise, 
irrational beliefs are irrational because they are the product of cognitive 
dispositions that are not knowledge-conducive. The beliefs of incorrigible 
conspiracy theorists are irrational because they are the product of 
cognitive dispositions that fail to produce knowledge even in normal 
circumstances. Knowledge and rationality are inextricably linked. 
 
Now, according to the RATIONALITY ONLY view it is simply not true that 
one ought to believe only what one knows. But if not – if there’s nothing 
wrong with non-knowledgeable beliefs – then two questions immediately 
arise: 
 
1.  If there’s nothing wrong with believing without knowing, then 
why is a belief rational only if it is the manifestation of a 
disposition conducive to knowing? 
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2. If a belief is rational only if it is the manifestation of a disposition 
conducive to knowing, but it’s fine to believe without knowing, 
then why be rational? 
 
Dilemmism can answer these questions. On (1): If KNOWLEDGE is a norm, 
then the existence of a derivative norm according to which one should 
manifest knowledge-conducive dispositions is exactly what we would 
expect, since a norm on action typically generates a norm to the effect that 
one should be the kind of person who complies with the first norm.17 On 
(2): If you should be the kind of person who complies with KNOWLEDGE, 
you should form beliefs in a way that it conducive to complying with it – 
that is, you should be rational. 
 
As things stand, the RATIONALITY ONLY view cannot answer either of these 
questions. This is a serious explanatory shortcoming. If adequate answers 
cannot be provided, then we should reject RATIONALITY ONLY. 
 
§6.2. A Solution to the Explanatory Problem? 
 
Can proponents of RATIONALITY ONLY solve the explanatory problem? It’s 
clear how they should approach it. The trick will be to explain the 
epistemological significance of knowledge in a way that answers our two 
questions but doesn’t entail that one ought to believe only what one 
knows.  
 
The most promising way to try to do this is to look for a positive normative 
or evaluative status that knowledge has which isn’t itself a requirement-
generating norm of belief. This is what Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp, and 
 
17 See Williamson (fc1) for discussion. 
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Harmen Ghijsen (2016, hereafter ‘SKG’) do. Following Conor McHugh 
(2012), they draw a distinction between prescriptive norms and evaluative 
norms. Prescriptive norms are about what one ought to do. Examples 
include ‘don’t steal, ‘don’t lie’, and ‘drive under 70mph on the motorway’. 
Their primary social function, SKG argue, is to reinforce certain forms of 
conduct and to discourage others. The function of the prescriptive norm 
‘drive under 70mph on the motorway’, for example, is to discourage 
dangerous driving. Evaluative norms are different. They don’t tell us what 
to do. Rather, they concern what it takes for a token of a particular type to 
be good or bad with regards to its type. Examples SKG give include ‘a 
good hospital is a clean hospital’, ‘a good knife is a sharp knife’, and ‘good 
driving is safe driving’.  
 
Evaluative norms don’t necessarily entail prescriptive norms. A good 
summer’s day is a sunny summer’s day. Thus, an evaluative norm applies 
to summer’s days. But it would be a mistake to think this entails a 
prescriptive norm according to which someone ought to make a summer’s 
day sunny. Nor do prescriptive norms necessarily entail evaluative norms. 
To take an example from SKG, suppose your boss has imposed a pointless 
rule for making coffee at the office, according to which you must scoop 
the coffee powder with the red teaspoon and the blue teaspoon alternately. 
If you only use the blue teaspoon, then you’ve violated a prescriptive 
norm. But that doesn’t mean you’ve violated an evaluative norm too. You 
might well still be making good coffee and making it in a good way. 
 
Nevertheless, SKG observe, there is often a relationship between 
evaluative and prescriptive norms. In particular, we can often derive 
prescriptive norms from evaluative norms. If a good hospital is a clean 
hospital, then it makes sense that there should be prescriptive norms in 
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place which encourage hospital cleanliness and discourage hospital 
dirtiness. 
 
SKG’s idea is that the evaluative/prescriptive distinction helps us to 
understand the relationship between knowledge and rationality. They 
maintain that there is an evaluative norm according to which a good belief 
is a knowledgeable belief, but no corresponding prescriptive norm 
according to which one ought to believe only what one knows. So they 
think we should replace KNOWLEDGE with KNOWLEDGE*: 
 
KNOWLEDGE*: One’s belief that p is a good belief only if one knows 
that p. 
 
By contrast, they maintain that RATIONALITY is a prescriptive norm: 
 
RATIONALITY: One ought, epistemically, to be epistemically 
rational 
 
This is because RATIONALITY fulfils the social function of a prescriptive 
norm: it reinforces behaviour conducive to fulfilling the evaluative norm 
KNOWLEDGE*.  
 
This view does not commit us to epistemic dilemmas arising from conflicts 
between KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY. It says there is only one thing the 
thief ought to do in the BRUEGHEL case: believe that p. Moreover, it appears 
to solve the explanatory problem. SKG can argue that the reason a belief 
is rational only if it is the manifestation of a disposition conducive to 
having knowledgeable beliefs is because the function of the RATIONALITY 
norm is to reinforce behaviour that is conducive to knowing. And the 
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reason one ought to be rational is because doing so is the best way of 
getting a good belief – that is, a belief that is knowledge. 
 
§6.3. Problems with this View 
 
There are several problems with this view. 
 
First, whilst it’s certainly true that a useful distinction can be drawn 
between evaluative and prescriptive norms, and that not all evaluative 
norms generate prescriptive norms, there is a large class of cases where 
they do and where the prescriptive norm has the same content as the 
evaluative norm. KNOWLEDGE is one of these cases. Let me explain. 
 
The reason the evaluative norm ‘a good summer’s day is a sunny 
summer’s day’ doesn’t generate a prescriptive norm is because there is 
nothing any agent can do to prevent violations of the norm. What it 
evaluates isn’t within the sphere of human action.18 By contrast, things are 
quite different in situations where an agent (or group of agents) has the 
power to ensure that an evaluative norm is complied with. Consider the 
evaluative norm ‘a good knife is a sharp knife’. From this we can derive a 
prescriptive norm for knife-makers: they ought to make sharp knives. 
Consider the evaluative norm ‘a good climate is a habitable climate’. 
Again, one can derive a prescriptive norm from it: we (i.e. humanity) 
ought to keep the climate habitable. Or consider ‘a good hospital is a clean 
hospital’. From this we can infer that the hospital staff ought to make the 
 
18 Although one might think that even this is up for grabs. Consider the conditional norm: 
‘You ought: if you can make a summer’s day sunny, do so’. (Thanks to Daniel Kodsi for 
bringing this up). 
DRAFT 31/03/2021 12:23 
Page 25 of 38 
 
hospital clean. Or consider ‘good driving is safe driving’. From this we can 
infer that one ought to drive safely.  
 
In general, where N is an evaluative norm, and it is within one’s power to 
ensure that N is satisfied, then one ought to ensure that it is satisfied. Call 
this the ‘good-to-ought’ principle.19 Applying it to normative 
epistemology, it follows that if a belief that p is a good belief only if one 
knows that p, then one ought to believe that p only if one knows that p. In 
other words, KNOWLEDGE is a genuine prescriptive norm, just as 
dilemmism tells us. 
 
Anti-dilemmists like SKG have to deny this, of course. But these inferences 
all look reasonable, so if we’re going to reject them, we will want good 
grounds for doing so. What could they be? The obvious answer is that 
these allegedly prescriptive norms don’t fulfil the social function of 
prescriptive norms, which is to encourage and reinforce certain forms of 
behaviour that are conducive to complying with evaluative norms. But, 
prima facie, this is an implausible claim. After all, what better way is there 
to get a sharp knife, a clean hospital, or a knowledgeable belief than to tell 
the relevant person that they should make the knife sharp, the hospital 
clean, or the belief knowledge? Moreover, actual practice, at least in my 
 
19 One conclusion we shouldn’t draw from the good-to-ought principle is that, e.g., a knife-
maker ought to make as many sharp knives as possible. Rather, the relevant prescriptive 
norm for the knife-maker is ‘you ought: if you make a knife, make a sharp knife’. I bring this 
up because McHugh (2012) appeals to this kind of dubious conclusion to reject the principle. 
The fact that the Louvre is a good museum, he points out, doesn’t entail that, before it existed, 
someone was required to create it – not even the person responsible for Parisian museums. 
This is true, but it’s irrelevant. The relevant prescriptive norm is not  ‘One ought to create the 
Louvre’, but rather ‘one ought: if one is creating a museum, create a good museum’. (It is not 
‘one ought: if one is creating a museum, create the Louvre’, because creating the Louvre is 
not the only way of creating a good museum). 
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community, suggests that KNOWLEDGE does in fact serve the function of 
encouraging and reinforcing behaviour. We frequently rebuke others by 
pointing out that they don’t know that p with the hope of getting them to 
not say or believe what they do not know. Indeed, this kind of criticism 
seems to be just as common, and perhaps more common, than criticism 
that appeals to irrationality, unreasonableness, and the like.  
 
Nevertheless, there may be something to SKG’s idea. Consider our thief in 
the BRUEGHEL case. Were he to not believe that p, he would avoid having 
a non-knowledgeable belief on this occasion, but the disposition that he 
manifests would be a bad one, since it will usually result in him not 
acquiring knowledge when it is available. Hence, his behaviour is the sort 
of thing that should be discouraged, given KNOWLEDGE*. By contrast, 
when he believes that p, he believes without knowing, and so has a bad 
belief on this occasion, but he manifests a disposition that usually results 
in knowledge, and so his behaviour should be encouraged. For this reason, 
a norm like RATIONALITY, which encourages and reinforces knowledge-
conducive dispositions makes more sense given the functional role of 
prescriptive norms than does a norm like KNOWLEDGE. 
 
However – and this brings us to the second problem – whilst prescriptive 
norms can have social functions, it is not a necessary condition on the 
existence of such norms that they have social functions. Like Greco’s 
proposal, this idea faces the problem of inscrutable cognizers. Let me 
explain. 
 
We are thinking of rationality as a matter of exercising cognitive 
dispositions that are conducive to knowing. As I emphasized earlier, the 
possession and exercise of such dispositions is just as important for non-
human animals like octopuses, lobsters, and other inscrutable cognizers, 
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as it is for us. But obviously there is no chance whatsoever of encouraging 
or reinforcing knowledge-conducive behaviour in an inscrutable cognizer 
like an octopus or a lobster by issuing prescriptions to them. The very idea 
is comical. Try telling a lobster it’s being irrational and see how far you 
get. There are two conclusions we might draw from this. One is that it isn’t 
true that inscrutable cognizers ought to have and exercise knowledge-
conducive dispositions.20 That is implausible. The other is that the 
existence of a prescriptive norm does not depend on the norm’s capacity 
to encourage and reinforce behaviour. This is the right conclusion to draw. 
But if so, then the fact that KNOWLEDGE does not encourage and reinforce 
forms of behaviour that are conducive to knowing as well as RATIONALITY 
does is no reason to think it isn’t a prescriptive norm. This is not to say 
that we cannot make use of prescriptive norms to encourage and reinforce 
certain kinds of behaviour. We can. But it is not a precondition on 
something being a prescriptive norm that we can make use of it in this way. 
 
Thinking about inscrutable cognizers makes this point vivid. But strictly 
speaking, it isn’t necessary. We can stay closer to home. Imagine a 
community of people are exceptionally epistemically stubborn – they 
refuse to (or perhaps simply can’t) pay heed to one another’s appraisals of 
their epistemic behaviour. In this community – let’s call them 
‘stubborners’ – the practice of judging beliefs to be rational or irrational 
makes no difference whatsoever to their behaviour (and presumably will 
soon die out). According to SKG’s view, RATIONALITY doesn’t apply to 
stubborners as a prescriptive norm, because it fails to fulfil the function of 
such norms: it doesn’t encourage and reinforce certain kinds of 
 
20 The thought might be that only an evaluative version of RATIONALITY applies to them. But 
notice that, if so, epistemic dilemmas reemerge, this time as conflicts between evaluative 
norms.  
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behaviours. Yet it surely remains the case that RATIONALITY is an epistemic 
norm that applies to stubborners. 
 
The third problem with SKG’s proposal is that it is quite unclear why the 
reasoning they employ should lead us to accept their package, according 
to which KNOWLEDGE* is an evaluative norm and RATIONALITY is a 
prescriptive norm, rather than some other package. Good action is 
successful action – action that achieves its purpose. We can think of this as 
an evaluative norm. Acting successfully usually requires acting on 
knowledge.21 So we should expect a norm like KNOWLEDGE to exist, the 
function of which is to reinforce behaviour conducive to satisfying the 
evaluative norm of successful action. By SKG’s reasoning, this makes 
KNOWLEDGE a prescriptive norm rather than an evaluative norm. Why 
prefer SKG’s view to this one? I can’t see any reason to. 
 
The same problem arises in the opposite direction: we can use SKG’s 
reasoning to conclude that RATIONALITY should be recast as an evaluative 
norm rather than a prescriptive norm. Being rational isn’t easy. Empirical 
work in cognitive and social psychology suggests that we are prone to a 
range of cognitive biases. Beliefs formed as a result of these biases are often 
 
21 Of course, it’s possible to act successfully whilst acting on non-knowledgeable beliefs, but 
in such cases, luck typically provides a helping hand. To see this, consider a Gettier case 
(based on Chisholm 1966). Robin is a farmer. She needs to get the sheep back in their pen 
before nightfall, so the wolves don’t get them. She sees what looks exactly like a sheep in a 
field over the way, but which is in fact a dog which has been dressed up to look like a sheep 
by a local prankster. As a result of her perceptual experience, Robin forms the belief that 
there is a sheep in the field, and starts to walk over with the intention of bringing it in. Luckily 
for her, there is a sheep in the field, hidden behind a tree, so her belief is true but not 
knowledge. Her journey will not be wasted, but this is only because of the lucky coincidence. 
Had there not been a hidden sheep, she would have traipsed over there for nothing. By 
contrast, had she known that there was a sheep in the field, her success would not have been 
dependent on good luck. 
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the product of cognitive dispositions that are not conducive to 
knowledge.22 According to the theory of rationality we are working with, 
this means they are not rational. In situations where being rational is hard, 
prescriptive norms can emerge which serve to encourage compliance with 
RATIONALITY. An example is anti-bias training in the workplace, which 
attempts to ameliorate implicit bias.23 Should we conclude that 
RATIONALITY is best recast as an evaluative norm, and that the prescriptive 
norms are things like ‘undergo anti-bias training’? Once again, it is hard 
to see what rules out this way of approaching the issue.  
 
SKG do not provide us with a satisfactory theory of the relationship 
between knowledge and rationality. Ipso facto they do not provide us with 
a satisfactory solution to the explanatory problem. So we should prefer 
dilemmism, which does not face the problem. 
 
 
§VII. Other Approaches 
 
 
Things aren’t looking good for non-dilemmic approaches to conflicts 
between KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY, nor for the claim that disputes 
between dilemmists and others are merely verbal. But we haven’t 
exhausted the options yet. In the rest of the chapter, I’ll look at some of 




22 See Hughes (fc2) 
23 Although only with limited success, according to the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (Report 113).  
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One common reaction to the claim that cases like that of Sartre’s student 
are moral dilemmas is to argue that the agent doesn’t face two conflicting 
requirements – to stay home and to go and fight, for example – but rather 
a single, non-conflicting, disjunctive requirement: to either stay home or go 
and fight.24 If epistemic dilemmas are analogous to moral dilemmas, then 
this response might also look attractive when it comes to conflicts between 
KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY. The resulting view would be a kind of 
radical permissivism. It would say that our thief ought to either believe 
that they have a painting by Brueghel or not believe it. So long as he does 
one or the other, he’s doing fine. 
 
Whatever its merits when it comes to moral dilemmas, radical 
permissivism has little to recommend it as an approach to conflicts 
between KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY. Because it says there is nothing 
wrong with believing without knowing, it too faces the explanatory 
problem. As far as I can tell, it provides no solution. It also fails to 
accommodate the datum that each of KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY seems 
to be distinctly non-optional. For these reasons, it should be rejected. 
 
§7.2. The Weighing Approach 
 
A different approach holds that each of KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY 
generates genuine epistemic requirements, but one of these requirements 
is weightier than the other, and so takes precedence when the two conflict. 
This approach holds the promise of offering us a univocal, non-dilemmic, 
answer to what our thief should believe: either he should believe that p, 
 
24 Donagan (1984), Zimmerman (1996). 
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because RATIONALITY outweighs KNOWLEDGE, or he should not believe that 
p, because KNOWLEDGE outweighs RATIONALITY. And if he should believe 
that p, it isn’t also the case that he shouldn’t believe that p, and vice versa. 
 
The idea that one can face two conflicting requirements, one of which 
outweighs the other, has some appeal in certain cases of moral conflict. If 
I’ve promised to meet a friend for lunch, but on my way over I come across 
someone having a severe asthma attack and I’m the only one around to 
help, then whilst I’ll violate an obligation whatever I do, it’s clear what I 
should do – break my promise and help the person.  
 
But how should we apply the idea to conflicts between KNOWLEDGE and 
RATIONALITY? Difficulties arise immediately. On the one hand, it seems 
plausible that RATIONALITY cannot outweigh KNOWLEDGE, since it depends 
on KNOWLEDGE for its normative force in the first place. On the other hand, 
we tend to judge violations of RATIONALITY more harshly than we do 
violations of KNOWLEDGE that aren’t also violations of RATIONALITY. If our 
thief mistakenly believes that they have a Brueghel, it’s understandable – 
anyone would have done the same in his situation. By contrast, if he 
doesn’t believe that they have a Brueghel, thereby complying with 
KNOWLEDGE but violating RATIONALITY, we’ll usually be much less 
sympathetic – the man’s an idiot. And this seems to suggest that 
RATIONALITY should take precedence over KNOWLEDGE. 
 
The problem is that the badness of violating RATIONALITY is altogether 
different to the badness of violating KNOWLEDGE. Violations of the latter 
don’t necessarily reflect poorly on the cognitive dispositions of the agent. 
Rather, they focus on the bad results their cognition produced on this 
occasion. By contrast, violations of the former don’t necessarily tell us 
anything about how the agent’s cognition fared on this occasion, but they 
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do reflect poorly on the agent’s cognitive dispositions. There are two kinds 
of rights and wrongs here, not one, and they cannot be judged along the 
same, or at least sufficiently similar, dimensions of evaluation in a way 
that makes meaningful weighing possible. This incommensurability 
makes it impossible to apply the weighing approach. 
 
§7.3. The Excuses Approach 
 
Another approach is to accept KNOWLEDGE but reject RATIONALITY, 
arguing that those who accept RATIONALITY have confused excusable 
violations of one norm with the existence of another norm.25 Since an agent 
who complies with RATIONALITY does what any reasonable person trying 
to comply with KNOWLEDGE would do in their situation, they should not 
be blamed or criticised for believing that p. But, the argument goes, this 
only shows that they have a good excuse for believing that p, not that they 
ought to have believed that p. Excuses mitigate wrongdoing. They don’t 
make wrongdoing rightdoing. 
 
If the claim here was simply that the fact that a belief is rational makes it 
an excusable violation of KNOWLEDGE, then I would agree. This is not in 
tension with the idea that RATIONALITY is a requirement-generating norm. 
Hence, it is compatible with the dilemmic view. But a stronger claim is 
being made: that rational beliefs are not merely excusable violations of 
KNOWLEDGE, but that there is no sense in which one ought to have rational 
beliefs – that is, RATIONALITY isn’t a genuine epistemic norm. And this, it 
seems to me, is seriously misguided. If it were correct, we should not think 
anything is going wrong, epistemically speaking, when one believes 
irrationally, provided that one complies with KNOWLEDGE. This entails, 
 
25 Littlejohn (2013, fc1) 
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inter alia, that there would be nothing wrong with our thief suspending 
judgement on whether they have a Brueghel, despite the fact that he hasn’t 
the slightest reason to think it’s a fake, since in suspending judgement, he 
complies with KNOWLEDGE. This is extremely counterintuitive, to say the 
least. Clearly something has gone wrong. Dilemmism accommodates that 
observation. The excuses view does not. So, we should prefer dilemmism. 
 
§7.4. The Dividing Approach 
 
Like dilemmists, dividers (e.g. Littlejohn fc2) think KNOWLEDGE and 
RATIONALITY are both genuine epistemic norms, and that conformity with 
each is non-optional. However, they maintain that the two norms don’t 
really conflict.26 This, they claim, is because ‘ought’ means two different 
things in KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY. Our thief oughtK not believe that 
they have a Brueghel, and oughtR to believe that they have one. But 
according to the divider there is no more of a conflict here than there is in 
saying that I canLEGAL buy a house in Hampstead (no law prohibits it), but 
also can’tFINANCIAL buy a house in Hampstead (I don’t have that kind of 
money), or that a guy is tallACADEMIC for an academic, but not tallBASKETBALL for 
a basketball player. 
 
However, the claim that distinguishing between two meanings of ‘ought’ 
shows that there is no conflict looks wildly implausible when applied to 
analogous cases. Consider Sartre’s student’s dilemma again. In keeping 
with their approach to conflicts between KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY, a 
divider might argue that he oughtFAMILY to stay home, and oughtPATRIOTISM to 
 
26 At least, this is something one often hears. I’m not sure if it’s Littlejohn’s view. At one point 
he suggests that dilemmists can be dividers. So it may be that he sees the dividing approach 
as a way of semantically implementing dilemmism, rather than as a competing view. 
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go and fight. This may be true. But the idea that this shows there is no 
dilemma after all is absurd. Or suppose we invent a silly game with two 
rules. Rule 1: If it’s a Monday, you must wear a hat. Rule 2: If it’s an even-
numbered calendar day, you must not wear a hat. On Monday the 2nd, 
these rules conflict, giving rise to a dilemma. It would be ridiculous to try 
to deny this by pointing out that you oughtRULE-1 to wear a hat, but oughtRULE-
2 to not wear a hat. Again, this may be true, but it does absolutely nothing 
to show that there isn’t a conflict.27 If the divider’s claim isn’t plausible in 
these cases, there is no reason to think it is any more plausible when it 
comes to conflicts between KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY. 
 
 
§VIII. Summing Up 
 
 
Greco argues that there cannot be epistemic dilemmas; the mark of an 
epistemic dilemma is unavoidable epistemic residue, and there cannot be 
such a thing – the Reflection Argument shows as much. We have seen that 
the Reflection Argument doesn’t work. It relies on the false assumption 
that we cannot rationally engage in preemptive epistemic quasi-blame, it 
overgenerates disastrously, and it faces the problem of inscrutable 
cognizers. The problem of inscrutable cognizers also shows that epistemic 
residue is not a good diagnostic by which to identify epistemic norms – 
and hence epistemic dilemmas. But even if it was, contra Greco, epistemic 
dilemmas would be possible, as the Jamie case shows. Greco is also 
concerned that if we don’t identify epistemic dilemmas with unavoidable 
epistemic residue, we run the risk of merely verbal disputes. But as we 
have seen, this is incorrect – there are other diagnostic tools available with 
 
27 C.f. Gibbons (2013) 
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which to distinguish dilemmic from non-dilemmic views. Finally, we have 
seen that non-dilemmic approaches to KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY face 
serious problems, problems which dilemmism does not face. For this 
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